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 Local Pacs mirroring PAC in Parliament is a good idea but 
See walker 
 
Assurance on vfm at the organisational level is not present, and certainly not across a 
regional field. Nationally the NAO give an overall view but have not the scope nor are 
equipped to look at individual local authorities or other local public bodies. 
 
Governance of individual orgns is ill-equipped as now you have more partnership 
arrangements, shared services, outsourcing, joint ventures, corporatisation, community 
interest companies, companies owned by shares etc 
 
Some services such as education (and housing) now have a democratic deficit. 
 
Answerability will not be enough there will need to be trust. 
Place and space considerations will be important (physical and virtual) to get buy in. 
Proper resourced 
Link back to Parliament 
Proper powers including to follow any public service pound without the private sector (or 
others) hiding behind commercial confidentiality (all be it that some evidence may have to 
remain private to the committee)  
 
Issues are broad given adult social care taking up greater portions of local authority budgets, 
education is less visible as is out of local authority control and governance, and governance 
of contracting arrangements is questionable eg Grenfell, Carrillion and Capita. 
 
The public sector landscape has importantly changed eg devolution, combined authorities, 
significant increase in outsourcing and local authority trading companies (particularly those 
owned by shares) making an Audit Commission type regime less applicable in its previous 
structure. Also it is highly unlikely the government that abolished the Audit Commission 
would bring such a sized organisation back at this juncture on their argument of cost alone. 
 
Culture underpinned with data and information sharing. Armchair auditors have not 
materialised and while making data publicly available is welcomed this is not a panacea for 
not having professionals to collect, analyse and provide information. In my opinion the 
amount of data now available locally makes this even more necessary not less. 
 
The duty of a lpac 
To hold to account the delivery of public services by organisations 
working together across a locality, and to investigate the value for 
money of those services. 
I am assuming vfm has a broad conception ie e, e and e but also equity. 
 
having the freedom to follow the “public pound” around a local place. It would require 
exclusions for “local” spending on national issues such as defence, but we would 
envisage these exclusions to be narrowly focused. However, if this issue is not 
subject to legislation, the definition would be subject to local agreement, with public 
bodies and others essentially signing up to oversight by the local PAC. We envisage 
that, in any formulation, this would include oversight over public services which are 
contracted out, delivere 
 
 
We have set out some specific questions below and would welcome views:  
 
How can agreement be brokered on the central point of the need for a local  
PAC, amongst a sufficiently broad range of organisations to make such a body 
viable? 
 
Is there an “optimum” operating model for a PAC with the powers we have set out – 
or is it right that there be significant divergence between areas based on local need 
and appetite? 
 
How much of a challenge is it for a local PAC to engage in the cultural aspects of its 
work – particularly when that involves engaging in the internal culture, behaviours, 
attitudes and values of decision-makers in individual organisations? 
 
What level of co-operation is required with existing governance systems? 
 
Is “value for money” as we have defined it an adequate focus and driver for the 
PAC’s work? 
 
How can local people be involved in the PAC’s work? 
 
How can we have confidence that local PACs – individually and collectively – are 
working to deliver the kind of outcomes we ho 
 
 
 
Context 
 
If there is a hard Brexit and we are no longer part of a protected EU market, there is an 
opportunity to rebalance the UK economy under a devolution agenda. This could provide a 
boost to the English regions in particular as ‘Integrated and Sustainable Cities’. 
  
In rebalancing the UK economy, the regions must play a crucial role in Brexit and help make 
a success of it. Under an industrial strategy the regions can be drivers of economic growth. 
Lord Michael Heseltine’s 2012 report ‘no stone unturned’ had already convinced government 
of the necessity to drive growth in the regions, but Brexit provides an external and unexpected 
shock that can fire a serious change. At the same time, the regions can help to address issues 
for a fairer society and repair the bonds of social cohesion (Ferry 2016a). 
 
Following Brexit the public services must be given the powers and resources to support the 
industrial strategy across the diverse regions of the UK. As a result, the government itself will 
inevitably grow as roles currently carried out in the EU will now need to be undertaken here in 
the UK, and local government will become more intertwined in supporting economic growth 
(Ferry and Eckersley 2017).  
 
My Research  
 Under these changes, new regional institutions and forms of accountability and scrutiny will 
be necessary and it is here that ‘my’ research has already been having impact with reports to 
the NAO (Ferry and Murphy 2015a) and CfPS (Ferry and Murphy 2015b), and evidence to 
Parliament’s Communities and Local Government Select Committee and Public Accounts 
Committee that was cited in their reports (Ferry 2016b, 2016c) and written evidence to the 
European Scrutiny Committee on Brexit (Ferry 2016a).  
 
The abolition of the Audit Commission and scrapping of centralised performance management 
systems means there are currently limited institutional arrangements for assessing local value 
for money (Ferry, Eckersley and Zakaria 2015). The focus has been financial conformance 
rather than operational performance (Ferry and Eckersley 2015). Central government relies on 
the system of local accountability for assurance over the value for money of funding it gives 
local authorities. The Department’s core principles state that local authorities’ prime 
accountability is to their local electorate, and that local councillors are best placed to decide 
what is value for money locally (Ferry and Murphy 2015). Given that services are being 
increasingly devolved to local areas there are concerns that there may be a gap in value for 
money scrutiny (Ferry and Murphy 2017). 
 
With the abolition of the Audit Commission, the National Audit Office has become the main 
professional body examining public expenditure to ensure value for money, but while they look 
at sector-wide issues they cannot assess whether individual local authorities are achieving value 
for money.  
 
MP Meg Hillier (2016), Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, recently highlighted in 
December 2016 that this raises a significant issue of who is there to speak truth to power? 
Public value is best determined by citizens and their local representatives, but if so what local 
arrangements should we have to oversee all these devolved funds. Should each area have its 
own public accounts committee for example?  
 
Over recent years several main scrutiny governance models have emerged ranging from the 
local Public Accounts Committee at one end of the spectrum to the traditional model at the 
opposite. Whilst the local public account committees have much to commend them they will 
also more expensive to operate, and so a balance will have to be struck. Indeed whilst structures 
can work to encourage people to behave in certain ways and it is important to get it right, there 
is no one size fits all model for scrutiny and governance. It is also crucially important to take 
account of the ‘culture’ of each place and the ‘context’ surrounding capacity, capability and 
other issues (Ahrens and Ferry 2015, 2016). Indeed whilst local responsibility needs an 
overhaul, there is also a need to overhaul the financial technical arrangements (Ferry, Eckersley 
and van Dooren 2015; Ferry, Coombs and Eckersley 2017). Otherwise the whole process could 
be doomed to failure – A message the Layfield Committee alluded to over four decades ago. 
 
It is with regard to this governance and scrutiny that my research suggests that local 
accountability will play a crucial part not only due to Brexit and the industrial strategy but 
increased devolved funding and revenue raising powers, increased privatisation of services and 
funding pressures (Ferry and Eckersley 2017).  
 
 
